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But the book makes no new contribution to thought, and does not at all seek to meet the objections to its special doctrines which the writer must have anticipated. It is popular, rather than scientific.

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FORMAL LOGIC: A Scientific and Social Problem. By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912. Pp. xviii, 423.

In this book Dr. Schiller paves the way for the task which was foreshadowed in "Humanism,"—the reform and reconstruction of Logic. The book is entirely polemical and destructive, being "an attempt to expound the traditional doctrine strictly, in its dependence on its fundamental assumption, *viz.*, that it is possible to study the *formal truth* of thought irrespective of its truth in point of fact, and to show that this fundamental abstraction everywhere leads to failure, failure both to account for the procedure of human thinking and failure to attain even formal consistency." The result is somewhat disappointing. In the first place, as Dr. Schiller himself hints in the preface, there is little in his criticisms that is wholly new. The formal logic which he is attacking has been long dead, and it is doubtful if there is a single teacher of logic in Great Britain who would be found to defend the traditional views in their entirety. The fact is that it will probably be difficult for anyone unfamiliar with the atmosphere of Oxford to appreciate the book fully. In Oxford, Aristotle is still regarded with a superstitious reverence, and each topic is approached with the presupposition that his view will be found to be the soundest. Moreover, there is an unfortunate tradition in Oxford by which the student of philosophy is expected to pass an examination in "Formal Logic" before he begins to study logic proper; the result is that the lecturer has to do his best to make out a case for the formal doctrines, with the uneasy feeling that the less able of his pupils will later on become hopelessly confused, while the abler will have to unlearn a great deal that he has taught them. The difficulty is felt much less by teachers in other universities, who are able to treat the subject as a single whole. Even they, however, will find much to sympathize with in many of Dr.

Schiller's strictures. It is surely time, for instance, that the ludicrous and misleading practice of analyzing every judgment into subject, predicate, and copula were abandoned; the supposed necessity for recognizing a separate copula has done much to obscure the theory of judgment. The amount of space devoted to the Categories and Predicables, to Definition, Division, and Classification, is another indication of the Oxford origin of the book; the Aristotelian doctrine still has a prestige in Oxford which it possesses nowhere else.

A detailed examination of the logical points dealt with would be out of place in this JOURNAL. Dr. Schiller has certainly established his main contention,—that (to use his own words) “it is not possible to abstract from the actual use of the logical material and to consider ‘forms of thought’ in themselves, without incurring thereby a total loss, not only of truth but also of meaning.” He underrates, however, the value of formal logic as a test of consistency in thought, and attributes to it claims which it does not make. It is difficult, for instance, to see on what grounds he asserts that formal logic defines *all* judgment as true, simply because they claim truth. Any judgment that is actually made certainly claims to be true, but logic is only concerned with what will follow if it *is* true; I know of no logician who asserts that a judgment is true because it is made, and I cannot attach any meaning to the expression formal truth which Dr. Schiller uses. Again, it is surely a misrepresentation to say that, according to formal logic, inference *is to be* logically necessary, all proof *is to be* coercive. Logic does not attempt to terrorize; it simply recognizes the fact that there are certain inferences which *are* irresistible. These, however, occur mainly in such departments of thought as mathematics, and the mistake of formal logic lies in attempting to apply to all human thought forms which are only suited to thinking of a quasi-mathematical type. Formal logic has undoubtedly had a bad effect on science, religion, and politics, and the most valuable chapter in Dr. Schiller's book is that in which he points this out. The syllogism in particular has had a most baneful influence; the attempt to deal with a practical situation by applying a major premiss has led to untold evil, and is the never-failing resource of the dogmatist, the pedant, and the coward. Every situation is in fact unique, and requires a unique act of thought, in which only what is relevant shall be utilized, and that in the one way

which the situation demands. No actual thinking is carried on in the hard-and-fast way which formal logic assumes, and in pointing this out Dr. Schiller has done a good service. While one cannot help feeling that many of the author's chimeras are imaginary, and that formal logicians (if such beings exist) are not quite so much the slaves of their doctrines as he believes, it is at any rate true that those who are forced to teach the subject are almost bound to become a little hypocritical, and that they ought to be grateful for his pungent criticisms.

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NIETZSCHE ET LES THÉORIES BIOLOGIQUES CONTEMPORAINES. By Claire Richter. Paris: Mercure de France, 1911. Pp. 243.

The main object of this book is to show two things: First, that Nietzsche was preoccupied to a considerable degree with modern biological theories (he had repeatedly expressed the desire,—which, however, was not fulfilled,—to spend about ten years at Paris, Vienna, or Munich in the study of the natural sciences, p. 11). Second, that he was a Lamarckian, not a Darwinist; in other words, that he believed in transformism, but not in selection (thus he was right when he protested against those who, on account of the term *Superman*, called him a Darwinist, but he did not know himself that he was a Lamarckian, *S'il est darwinien sans le vouloir, on peut presque dire qu'il est lamarkien sans le savoir*, p. 9).

In the *Introduction* (pp. 5-43) the author gives a sort of catalogue of Nietzsche's reading in biology and physiology: *Lange* ("Gesch. d. Materialismus") introduced him to the modern natural sciences; he also knew Darwin, Haeckel (whom he dislikes heartily), Ruti Meyer (his friend, who is a decided Lamarckian), Naegeli (also a Lamarckian), E. von Baer (whom he calls "the great naturalist"), O. Schmidt, Schneider, Espinas, W. Roux, Rée, Rolph; among English authors, he was acquainted, directly or indirectly, with Spencer and Paneth ("Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development").

Some assertions in this chapter seem to contradict others in the body of the book. For example, on page 12 Mlle. Richter says that Nietzsche kept on to the last with his scientific studies, after having given up others, while in many chapters, as will be